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NEW FEDERAL MINING
LAW ABANDONMENT PROVISIONS:
A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW?

No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property without

the due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public
use without just compensation.
-Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States
By failing to comply with the registration requirements of the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), 1
owners of unpatented mining claims' may have unwittingly forfeited
their claims. This is true even if the mine claimants are presently
complying with their states' requirements and have continually done
so since first filing their claims: the provisions in FLPMA section 314
(c) provide for a determination of conclusive abandonment if no official record is filed with the Bureau of Land Management (BLM). 3
Application of section 314 (c) requires no hearing or personal notice
before the determination of abandonment is made. The implications
and potential for loss are grave for the mine claimant who properly
registered his claim at the local courthouse prior to FLPMA, but
failed to register with the BLM because he had no knowledge of the
new FLPMA provisions. There is also another danger of loss due to
lack of notice because the BLM records developed from documents
filed with the BLM under FLPMA, will be the government's only
source of personal notice in future government initiated contest proceedings.
The new mine claimant who fails to register under FLPMA is not
the subject of this present discussion, but rather the claimant who
1. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1701-1782 (1976 &
Supp. I 1978).
2. An unpatented mining claim gives the miner possession and ownership of a valuable
property right after he has made discovery of valuable mineral. The ownership is not in fee
simple absolute, however, it allows him to exploit the minerals on his claim to the exclusion
of others as long as he complies with the state and federal requirements for continued possession, ie. annual assessment work completion.
3. "The failure to file such instruments as required by subsections (a) and (b) of this
section shall be deemed conclusively to constitute an abandonment of the mining claim or
mill or tunnel site by the owner; but it shall not be considered a failure to file if the instrument is defective or not timely filed for record under other Federal laws permitting filing or
recording thereof, or if the instrument is filed for record by or on behalf of some but not all
of the owners of the mining claim or mill or tunnel site." 43 U.S.C. § 1744(c) (1976) (emphasis added).
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established and has continued to maintain the claim under the law
prior to FLPMA. Lack of notice of the changes in the mining law because of FLPMA can deprive the claim owner of a valuable property
right without due process of law.
The basis for application of the abandonment provisions of section
314 (c) lies in the critical requirements of its companion section,
FLPMA section 310. Under that section, owners of lode or placer
mining claims located on public lands prior to October 21, 1976
(FLPMA's implementation date) must file with the BLM within three
years following the passage of FLPMA and prior to December 31 of
each ensuing year.4 The type of filing required under the statute for
each claim is: a copy of the official record of the location notice or
certificate with a description sufficient to locate the claim on the
ground and either a notice of intent to hold the claim or an affidavit
of assessment work performed on the claim.' If the claim is located
after October 21, 1976 as a new claim located under FLPMA, the
locator has 90 days after location to file with the BLM at the office
nearest the claim. In both cases, failure to comply permits
the "con' 6
clusive determination of abandonment of the claim.
The abandonment provisions are part of the avowed congressional
purpose behind FLPMA: to remove stale mining claims from the
public domain and to bring the management of the public lands in
the United States under the control of the Department of the Interior through the BLM.' The implementation of this legislation raises
serious questions as to whether the constitutional rights of the mine
claimants already on the public domain are violated by the new
FLPMA provisions. The regulations promulgated by the Secretary of
the Interior under the FLPMA abandonment provisions also raise
questions as to their validity. There is concern that they go beyond
the FLPMA requirements themselves, making additional requirements for filing and imposing penalties for non-compliance with the
regulations.
PRIOR MINING LAW AND FLPMA
Integral to the present discussion is an understanding of how
FLPMA changes prior law. Therefore, a short discussion of the history of mining law is necessary.
4. 43 U.S.C. § 1744(a)-(b) (1976). A lode claim is a vein running beneath the surface.
A placer claim is located on the surface.
5. The location notice need only be filed once within the three-year period; the other
documents must be filed annually. Id. State laws require performance of a certain amount
of annual work on unpatented mining claims in order to hold them. This annual work is
known as assessment work.
6. See note 3 supra.
7. See 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (1976).
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The first recognized rights in mining law were based upon custom
as developed among the miners on the vacant public domain. No federal laws governed the acquisition of mining rights8 and the government's policy was to encourage transfers of the public land to private
citizens if they could put it to appropriate use.9 The first major codification of the then-established techniques for location and recognition of mining claim possession was the Mining Law of 1872.1 0 The
1872 act approved what miners had long recognized through custom:
squatters rights.1
The 1872 act further established maximum amounts of land for
single claims. A single placer claim could be no larger than 20 acres
and a single lode claim could not exceed 1,500 feet in length along
the vein or lode and could not extend more than 300 feet on each
side of the middle of the vein at the surface.' 2
Of equal legal importance was the 1872 law's failure to eliminate
the requirements imposed by the appropriate states. State laws normally include requirements for location, such as marking the corners
of the claim, and methods for posting notice of location. The federal
government encouraged local administrative control and accepted the
states' location and recording requirements.' I The states still show
individuality in their extant laws: although they are similar, they are
not uniform." They do, however, all include requirements for formalities of location, notice and discovery work.' I
One of the most basic concepts of mining custom and state laws is
the judicial doctrine of pedis possessio.1 6 Pedis possessio allows a
person to peacefully hold possession of the claim after location while
searching for valuable mineral.' I The doctrine gives the miner an opportunity to make discovery which will lead to an unpatented mining
claim. In order to maintain pedis possessio, the miner must be ac'

8. Strauss, Mining Caims on PublicLands: A Study of InteriorDepartmentProcedures,
1974 UTAH L. REV. 185, 186. Although Strauss wrote the article prior to passage of
FLPMA in 1976, he states the position of those favoring federal registration of claims and
traces the background of mining law.
9. Id. at 187.
10. Act of May 10, 1872, ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91 (codified in scattered sections of 30

U.S.C).
11. Strauss, supra note 8, at 186.
12. 30 U.S.C. § § 23, 35 (1976).
13. Strauss, supra note 8, at 188.
14. Id. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § § 5.46, 5.50-.80 (Repl. 1975, 1977 &
1979), for discussion of variations among state laws.
15. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 5.46 (Repl. 1975).
16. Pedis possessio allows the prospector to explore peaceably on the unappropriated
public domain while he is diligently looking for valuable mineral prior to discovery. See
Note, Monopolization of Public Lands or Necessary Liberalization of Exploration Laws?,

20 NAT. RES. J. 387 (1980).
17. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 4.11 (Repl. 1976).
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tively searching for valuable mineral and must be present on the
claim.'8 At this point in the work, the miner does not have an unpatented mining claim. Possession only ripens into an unpatented
mining claim once discovery is made.' I The miner's rights against
the federal government commence when this valuable mineral discovery is made. 2 0 The federal government recognizes that the miner has
valuable rights in the mineral but it does not challenge the discovery
of an unpatented mining claim. If the miner seeks to patent the claim
and is, therefore, requesting a fee simple absolute title to the land
and minerals, then the federal government seriously examines the
proof of discovery. 2'
Prior to FLPMA under the 1872 Mining Act, miners were required
to record discovery and claim to an unpatented title in the recorder's
office for the county where the discovery was made. In order to
maintain the claim, they had to do at least $100 of "assessment
work" annually and file an affidavit to that effect in the same county
courthouse. 2 2 Failure to perform the annual assessment work opened
a claim to location by other miners.2 FLPMA did not change these
requirements of the 1872 act. It merely added the requirement of
registration with the BLM.
Both FLPMA and the Mining Act of 1872 distinguish between
patented and unpatented mining claims. The record of discovery,
claim to title, annual assessment work, and now registration with the
BLM, are required for maintaining an unpatented mining claim.
These are also prerequisites to filing for a patent. If a miner wants
to carry the unpatented mining claim to fee simple absolute status,
he or she can apply for such a title, in the form of a patent. The federal government's last review of the miner's claim to the land and
minerals is in the patent process. Therefore, before it gives up absolute title to a portion of the public domain, under prior law and
FLPMA, the Department of Interior will carefully examine the proof
of discovery of valuable mineral. It no longer takes the miner's word
for the discovery, as was done when the unpatented mining claim was
first recorded. Consequently, the patenting process is both costly and
time consuming.
Professor Peter L. Strauss of Columbia University School of Law
has pointed out the unlikelihood that a miner who has an unpatented
mining claim will take it to patent:
18. Id.

19.
20.
21.
22
23.

Id. at § § 4.13, .15 (RepL 1976).
Strauss, supra note 8, at 189.
See id. at 192.
30 U.S.C. § 28 (1976).
Id.
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the possibility that the serious miner will seek to patent his

claims has become remote. The application process has become increasingly complex, time consuming, and expensive. Miners are
almost as well protected by the laws governing possession as they
would be by a patent. Under established policy, the Department [Interior] does nothing to challenge the validity of claims unless they
are presented for patent or the government immediately needs the
lands involved. Since the Department [Interior] does not distinguish
between "discovery" for the purpose of possession and the "discovery" required to obtain a patent, it treats denial of a patent application for want of discovery as demonstrating the invalidity of the
underlying claim. 2 4
Prior to the passage of FLPMA, the federal government didn't
know about claims on the public domain until they were brought to
patent. Because the Mining Act of 1872 and the individual state laws
did not provide for registration of mining claims with the federal government, only the states kept records of mining titles. The federal
government had no effective means to determine which claims were
dormant or abandoned except through costly searches of the county
records in the courthouses across the country. Prior to FLPMA, the
federal government also made no effort to acquire this information
from the county records throughout the country.' s The passage of
FLPMA was an effort to cure this inability to secure information
quickly about the federal lands. Often the lack of such information
was an increasing burden upon the federal government during contest
proceedings and upon efforts for federal land management.6 The
state courthouses also continue to remain the main depositories for
title and other ancillary documents.
FLPMA CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
Clearly, the federal government has an increasing need to manage
its lands during the present period of energy resource exploration.
Abuses and improper uses of the lands do occur. The need for federal
land management should not, however, overshadow the possible constitutional infringements of the FLPMA abandonment procedures
employed to clear the public domain of stale and abandoned claims."'
The FLPMA provisions can extinguish valuable property rights
without a quiet title suit, a hearing, or even personal notice to mine
claimants who have proceeded in good faith under the prior mining
24. Strauss, supra note 8, at 192.
25. Id. at 196.
26. Id. at 197.

27. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1744(c) (1976).
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law. Under FLPMA, it is of no consequence that the mine claimant
has complied with the 1872 Mining Act and the state laws if he has
not complied with FLPMA by filing with the BLM. 2 8
This unwitting forfeiture of valuable property rights raises Fifth
Amendment questions of due process of law and the lack of just
compensation for private property taken for public use. The concept
of notice, inherent in the Fifth Amendment due process protections,
requires that a property owner be given an opportunity to be heard
before his property right is extinguished.
In considering similar situations where the names of property
owners have been known, the standard for notice enunciated by the
United States Supreme Court has been notice which is reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties
that property rights are in question. In 1950, the Supreme Court
established this standard in Mullane v. CentralHanover Bank & Trust
Co. I9 where the names of trust beneficiaries could have been ascertained through trust company records:
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in
any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties
of the pendency of the30action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections.
In applying FLPMA, the federal government has not used the type of
notice that Mullane requires. The standard for notice under the
FLPMA abandonment provisions, according to the federal government, is publication. Publication of the law or regulations is sufficient.
The unpatented mine claimants who have registered under the preFLPMA mining laws and who are in compliance with their appropriate
state mining laws have at best received notice through publication of
the law in the code and case reports or publication of the regulations
in the Federal Register. If the Mullane standard for notice is applied,
this type of statutory notice by publication is insufficient because
the names and addresses of those mine claimants who are in compliance with the pre-FLPMA mining laws could be ascertained through
a search of the county courthouse records. The Mullane decision specifically recognized that notice by publication, as is being given
under the FLPMA abandonment provisions, is inadequate because
28. See id.
29. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
30. Id. at 314.
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"under the circumstances it is not reasonably calculated to reach
those who could easily be informed by other means at hand." 3 1
The Mullane standard for notice reasonably calculated to apprise
the interested parties has been upheld by later Supreme Court decisions dealing with the taking of property. In Walker v. City of Hutchinson,3 2 the city commissioners gave no notice of a condemnation
hearing except by publication in an official city newspaper. The
appellant was a resident whose name was known to the city and was
on the official records. The Court held that the publication alone was
insufficient to
satisfy the due process clause of the Fourteenth
33
Amendment.
Similarly, in Schroeder v. City of New York, 3 4 the city instituted
proceedings to acquire the right to divert a portion of a river 25 miles
upstream from the appellant's summer home. Although appellant's
name and address could have easily been ascertained from the deed
records and tax rolls, no attempt was made to give notice to appellant except by publication and by posting notice. Again, the Court
held that the publication and posting of notice was insufficient to
meet the requirements of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
5
Amendment. 3
Arguments that the Mullane standard for notice is not constitutionally required for the FLPMA abandonment provisions of course
exist. The major policy argument asserts that the BLM must be freed
from the burden of finding and then challenging mining claims on
government lands for which other mutually exclusive uses are desired. 3 6 Many of these claims are stale and dormant. Therefore, the
most practical way to free the BLM from its burden is through allowing it to rely on nonregistration as conclusive evidence that the claim
no longer exists.3 Under this argument, the burden for establishing
reliable BLM mining claims records lies with the mine claimants
themselves, who receive no more notice of the FLPMA registration
regulations than the publication of the law or regulations in the Federal Register. In essence, the Mullane standard for notice is not given
before conclusive determinination of abandonment of a mining claim.
Proponents of the constitutionality of the FLPMA abandonment
provisions further contend that the statute itself creates an irrebut31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 319.
352 U.S. 112(1956).
Id.
371 U.S. 208 (1962).
Id.

36. Strauss, supra note 8, at 200 n.42.
37. Id.
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table and conclusive presumption, which is a congressional judgment
that the Congress is entitled to exercise, 3 8 and that the elements of a
taking of property are not present. 3 9 The act "simply requires that,
if the holder of an unpatented mining claim wishes to continue to
assert such claim without assuming the burden of demonstrating the
validity of the claim [proof of discovery], such claimant must furnish the notice [filing with the BLMI prescribed by the statute." 4 0
In other words, the mine claimant's property rights are not restricted
because the mine claimant can continue to use the property and hold
and develop the claim without obtaining a patent to the claimed
land. 4 ' The miner simply must file with the BLM as required by
FLPMA. How the miner is to know about FLPMA seems to be a
question that is not considered to any great extent. Again, notice by
publication of the law or publication of regulations in the Federal
Register is sufficient.
Although the constitutionality of the presumption of abandonment is defensible, some writers, such as Peter Strauss, have suggested
additional constitutional safeguards to reliance upon notice given
through publication of the law in legal reporters or publication of the
regulations in the Federal Register: employing a quiet title procedure
similar to that used in the Multiple Mineral Development Act. 4 2 The
act provides for a limited search for claims after which notice is given
personally or by publication to the claimants so that they can respond
or forfeit their interests. 4 3 Unfortunately, FLPMA fails to require
even these types of procedures.
Besides giving personal notice to the mine claimants who annually
register at the county courthouses, there are other possible and quite
feasible methods of giving notice reasonably calculated, as Mullane
requires, to reach those interested persons: visual inspection of the
land by local BLM officials and an inquiry by the BLM in the vicinity
after reviewing tract indices and the Department of Interior's own
records and posting of the land. 4 4 These methods are not considered
in the FLPMA abandonment provisions. The constitutional issues of
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment remain.
38. Defendants' Reply Memorandum at 6-8, Lewis v. United States, No. R-78-0219
BRT (D. Nev., Aug. 29, 1980).
39. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 17-17A,
Lewis v. United States, No. R-78-0219 BRT (D. Nev. Aug. 29, 1980) [hereinafter cited as
Summary Judgment Menorandum].
40. Id.
41. Id. at 17.
42. 30 U.S.C. § § 521-531 (1976). See also 30 U.S.C. § § 612-615 (1976).
43. Strauss, supra note 8, at 200 n.42.
44. Id. at 269-70.
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JUDICIAL CHALLENGES TO THE ABANDONMENT PROVISIONS:
THE ACT AND THE REGULATIONS
The constitutionality of the FLPMA abandonment provisions, as
regards the type of notice that is required, has been examined only
briefly in the courts. Two main challenges have been made. The first
challenge has directly attacked the abandonment provisions of the
act as being unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States. The second challenge has focused
on the regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior. The
regulations have been challenged on the grounds that they exceed the
scope of the secretary's power. The challenge to the regulations does
not require actual loss of a mining claim in order to gain standing. On
the other hand, actual loss of a mining claim may be required for the
direct challenge to the constitutionality of FLPMA in order to establish a case or controversy and to gain standing.
The constitutionality of the notice given to mine claimants is the
underlying issue in both of these court contests. The two different
approaches to challenging FLPMA's enforceability reflect the interests of the major groups who are directly affected by the FLPMA
abandonment provisions. To challenge the constitutionality without
having actually lost a mining claim is to risk dismissal before the
merits can be reached and must be considered before bringing suit.
The challengers who have chosen to use the regulations as the focal
point of their suit, apart from their desire to gain standing, seem to
have other reasons for not attacking FLPMA's constitutionality. They
are mainly large mining interests who knew about the mining law
changes in FLPMA and who may not want FLPMA to fail under a
constitutional attack.4 5 It appears to be a reasonable assumption
that such large mining interests need to clear the public domain of
stale or abandoned claims which serve as a nuisance and impediment
to their own resource exploration efforts. Because they see the secretary's regulations as going beyond FLPMA itself, they view their
rights as locators and mine claimants as being impaired. 46 The other
major group of challengers, those who have questioned the constitutionality of the act itself, are predominantly individual miners who
see the potential for loss of their claims or have already lost their
claims without just compensation because of lack of knowledge of
FLPMA.4 7
45. The plaintiffs in Topaz Beryllium Co. v. United States, 479 F. Supp. 309 (D. Utah
1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-2255 (10th Cir. Dec. 3, 1979) are a possible example.
46. Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellants' Colorado Mining Association and American
Mining Congress at 6, Topaz Beryllium Co. v. United States, No. 79-2255 (10th Cir., filed
Nov. 21, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Reply Brief].
47. The plaintiffs in Lewis v. United States, No. R-78-0219 BRT (D. Nev. Aug. 29,
1980), are a possible example.
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Two cases where FLPMA has been challenged are Topaz Beryllium
Co. v. United States4 8 and Lewis v. United States.4 9 Topaz Beryllium
is a challenge to the Secretary of the Interior's (Secretary) regulations and Lewis confronts the constitutionality of the act itself. The
approaches of the two cases are different, but the major purpose is
the same: to attack the consequences of failure to file with the BLM.
If the regulations are invalid, then the secretary will have to re-evaluate his position with regard to the FLPMA abandonment provisions.
This would include an examination of the type of records and filing
requirements that the BLM would require for the existing mining
claims on the public domain and the type of notice required when
using these records. The re-examination caused by invalidating the
regulations would not be as extensive or disruptive as the redrafting
of new abandonment provisions for the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act if the act itself were held unconstitutional.
Although the litigants in Lewis were dismissed from federal district
court for lack of a case or controversy and Topaz Beryllium is on appeal to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals with a decision expected
sometime in the spring of 198 1, these cases are representative of the
two types of challenges to FLPMA. The issues that they present will
have to be tackled by any litigant who seeks to attack the secretary's
regulations or the constitutionality of the act itself.
A. Topaz Beryllium
The plaintiffs' suit, brought in federal district court in Utah, challenged the Secretary of the Interior's regulations promulgated under
the FLPMA abandonment provisions. The two main issues presented
to the court were: first, whether the regulations' 0 under FLPMA
(providing for filing of information) go beyond the scope of authority delegated to the secretary to promulgate regulations and are
therefore, void; and second, whether a regulation which allows the
United States, in a government initiated contest, to rely exclusively
on its own records in determining to whom notice must personally
be given 5 ' is a deprivation of "due process" and thus constitutionally
defective.' 2 The regulations challenged in the first issue require the
48. Topaz Beryllium Co. v. United States, 479 F. Supp. 309 (D. Utah 1979), appeal
docketed, No. 79-2255 (10th Cir. Dec. 3, 1979).
49. Lewis v. United States, No. 78-0219 BRT (D. Nev. Aug. 29, 1980).
50. 43 C.F.R. § § 3833.0-1 to .5 (1979).
51. Id. § 3833.5(d).
52. 479 F. Supp. 309, 311-12(D. Utah 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-2255 (10th Cir.
Dec 3, 1979).
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filing of information with the BLM by present and future owners of
unpatented mining claims on the public domain. The trial court
agreed with the government and held that the secretary's regulations
do not violate the authority delegated to him under FLPMA." 3 Addressing the second issue, the court also determined that in government initiated proceedings, the government would not violate due
process notice requirements by relying exclusively upon its own records when determining to whom notice must be given.' 4 The case is
now on appeal to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. The appeal is
the subject of this discussion.
1. Secretary's Authority to Promulgate Regulations
The American Mining Congress and other mining associations in
the west intervened in the suit as Plaintiffs-Appellants. They argue
that the secretary lacks the power to demand more information in
the regulations than that required in FLPMA section 314, which sets
out the information gathering requirements of the act. These litigants
contend that the secretary should not be permitted to void claims for
failure to provide additional information than that which FLPMA itself requires.' I
Section 314 of FLPMA, the section requiring the mine claimant to
file a copy of the official record of location and either a notice of intent to hold the claim or an affidavit of assessment work performed,
operates as the abandonment provision of the statute. The secretary
is given specific statutory authority to promulgate regulations under
section 314 by its companion statute, section 310. The American
Mining Congress and the Colorado Mining Association contend that
there is no broad inherent power in the secretary to issue regulations
that will be accorded the same effect of law as the FLPMA provisions
even though section 310 contains specific statutory authority.' 6 According to their argument,
Congress has not by any statute delegated its general regulatory and
law-making authority to the defendants, and the Government has
cited no such authority. Indeed, Congress not only never has done
so, it was careful in its 1976 legislation to restrict the extent
of the
5
defendants' power to regulate under Section 310 thereof. 7
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Plaintiffs-Appellants' Supplemental Memorandum on Recent Case Law at 6, Topaz
Beryllium Co. v. United States, No. 79-2255 (10th Cir., filed Nov. 21, 1979) [hereinafter
cited as Supplemental Memorandum].
56. Reply Brief, supra note 46, at 5-10.

57. Id. at5.
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The mining groups further attack the FLPMA regulations under
section 314 as having no specific congressional grant of power which
accords them the effect of law if they add to the requirements of
FLPMA itself.ss The basis of this argument is that Congress expressly
excepted the revision of the 1872 Mining Act from FLPMA application and that the regulatory scheme of the 1872 act is continued
under the 1976 act:
In sum, the Government sets up a rule of law derived from statutory regulatory schemes wholly distinct from the scheme set up in
the 1872 Act, adhered to uniformly since 1872, and continued in
the 1976 Act, and then ignores the fact that, even under its own
scheme, the regulatoins at issue here cannot be sustained. Whether
Section 310 of the 1976 Act be considered a general grant of rulemaking authority, or not, the purposes of that Act are expressly
limited, by Section 302(b) of that Act, and the Government cannot
therefore first expand the purposes of Section 314 of the Act beyond those expressed therein, and then argue that any regulations
furthering those expanded purposes are within the scope of Section
310.'

9

The secretary's regulations for the FLPMA abandonment provisions,
according to the American Mining Congress and the Colorado Mining
Association, exceed the scope and purpose of section 314 as 6limited
0
by both its own language and the legislative history of the act.
Another vital point in the mining interests' arguments is that the
BLM has prescribed and implemented unauthorized penalties that
were not part of FLPMA. 6 1 The mine claimant who does not make
the extra filings and does not provide the additional information required by the regulations, which are not required by FLPMA section
314 itself, will nonetheless suffer the penalties of the conclusive
abandonment
determination because the secretary's regulations re62
quire it.
In their appellate brief, the American Mining Congress and the
Colorado Mining Association find similarities between FLPMA and
other legislation that limits the secretary's power. They compare the
secretary's FLPMA regulations to those of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (the Surface Mining Act). 6 3 In the
58. Id. at 10-15.
59. Id.at 14-15.

60. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellants American Mining Congress and Colorado Mining Association at 21-30, Topaz Beryllium Co. v. United States, No. 79-2255 (10th Cir., filed Nov.
21, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Brief of Appellants].
61. Id. at 31-36.
62. Id.at 34.
63. 30 U.S.C. § § 1201-1328 (Supp. III 1979).
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Peabody Coal case (In Re PermanentSurface Mining Regulation Litigation), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed the lower
court's opinion on the Surface Mining Act regulations and ordered the
secretary's regulations remanded. 6 ' "[T] he Court of Appeals determined that the language, purpose and regulatory structure of the
Surface Mining Act warranted the conclusion that the Secretary cannot, by regulation, require more information from permit applicants
than the minimum information mandated by Sections 507 and 508
of [the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977] .,,6S
The American Mining Congress and the Colorado Mining Association,
therefore, contend that the Secretary's regulations in FLPMA, which
are similar to those of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act of 1977, should also not require more information than that required by FLPMA itself.
In analogizing the District of Columbia decision to the FLPMA
regulations, the two mining groups point out the great similarity of
the general rulemaking section 201(c)(2) of the Surface Mining Act
to the rulemaking section 310 of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976.66 As stated earlier, section 314 of FLPMA requires that mine claimants file with the BLM and section 314 empowers the Secretary to promulgate these rules and regulations to
carry out the purposes of FLPMA.
The secretary, in the Surface Mining Act regulations, asserted the
same argument as he now does as the defendant-appellee in Topaz
Beryllium: a provision such as section 310 of FLPMA or section 201
(c)(2) of the Surface Mining and Reclamation Act grants general rulemaking power, which allows the secretary to demand additional information and to impose penalties of non-compliance, even though
not specified in the statute. 6 7 The American Mining Congress and
the Colorado Mining Association view the government's argument as
did the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The
court of appeals' analysis of the secretary's argument brought out
two points: (1) section 201(c)(2) (like FLPMA section 310) begs the
question of whether prescribing additional information requirements
is consistent with the act and (2) the statutory construction argument that an act's provisions should be read so as to render none
superfluous is weak and unpersuasive. 6 I The court could not base its
64. In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, No. 80-1308 (D.C. Cir. July

10, 1980).
65. Supplemental Memorandum, supra note 55, at 1-2.

66. Id. at 2.
67. Id. at 2-3.
68. Id. at 3.
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decision on this type of statutory construction, which it considered
hopelessly circular in its application to the Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act of 1977.6 9 The American Mining Congress and
the Colorado Mining Association apparently support the District of
Columbia court's arguments with regard to FLPMA section 310 when
considering the secretary's contention that he has a right to demand
additional information and to impose penalties for noncompliance
not specified in the statute.
In short, the intervenor mining groups believe that construing
FLPMA to allow expansion of the scope of the forfeiture penalty and
the information reporting requirements of section 314 would permit
the secretary to take away by regulation the property rights of mine
claimants that allow them to hold and to develop their unpatented
mining claims pursuant to the Mining Act of 1872. Congress specifically stated in section 302(b) of FLPMA that these property rights
merit protection and are not to be impaired. 7 The American Mining
Congress and the Colorado Mining Association further argue that the
congressional intent to give specific protection to existing property
rights is inherent in the limitations imposed on the secretary's regulatory authority under section 310 by FLPMA section 701(a), (f) and
(h). 7 1
The Topaz Beryllium Company brief focuses on much the same
arguments as does that of the American Mining Congress and Colorado Mining Association. The crux of Topaz Beryllium's arguments is
that FLPMA section 314 "does not constitute statutory authority for
the regulations challenged in this action. Nor are those regulations
authorized by any other act of Congress. For in section 314, Congress
departed from previously settled federal policy to require, for the
first time, that owners of unpatented mining claims notify federal
land managers of their claims' existence. ' 72 Topaz Beryllium argues
that the section 314 regulations require more than section 314 itself
and they "seriously jeopardize the validity of private mining claims
'7 3
in instances where Congress has never seen fit to penalize owners.
69. Id.
70. Except as provided in section 1744, section 1782 and subsection (f) of section 1781 of this title and in the last sentence of this paragraph, no provision
of this section or any other section of this Act shall in any way amend the
Mining Law of 1872 or impair the rights of any locators or claims under that
Act, including, but not limited to, rights of ingress and egress.
43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (1976).
71. See Supplemental Memorandum, supra note 55, at 5.
72 Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant Topaz Beryllium Company at 7, Topaz Beryllium Co. v.
United States, No. 79-2255 (10th Cir., filed Nov. 21, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Topaz
Brief].
73. Id.
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In its brief, Topaz Beryllium takes issue with the district court's
interpretation of congressional intent. According to Topaz Beryllium,
the court seriously mistakes Congress' method in fashioning the statute by concluding that the challenged regulations merely "fill-in" the
purposes of section 314." 4 The true issue, as seen by Topaz Beryllium,
is that Congress did not provide the secretary with powers to impose
additional requirements and penalties. Section 314 was passed for
the purpose of giving the BLM notice of the existence of minng
claims and was not intended to supplant the county recorder's office
as the repository for mining claim title documents. S Therefore, in
Topaz Beryllium's view, the mine claimant should not be required to
file anything other than the copies of instruments that the claimant
has already filed in the county courthouse, as is required by FLPMA
section 314 itself.7 6 In short, the secretary's required documents and
the penalty of "conclusive determination of abandonment" for failure to comply with the regulation requirements exceed the authority
conferred on the secretary by section 314 of FLPMA. 7 7 "The BLM
has departed from the simple and relatively inexpensive requirements
of section 314, and has created a costly regulatory mechanism bearing no relation to Congress's purposes. '"78
2. Notice Requirements of Due Process After Filing With the BLM
In addition to the notice requirements discussed earlier for the
initial filing with BLM under FLPMA, is the question of notice which
is required when the government engages in a contest with a mine
claimant. The problem arises because the federal government now intends to consider the BLM records, developed from the filings of
mine claimants under FLPMA with its possible inadequate notice for
the initial filings, as the official repository of documents which delineate ownership of mining claims. 7 9 Topaz Beryllium and the American Mining Congress and the Colorado Mining Association all take
exception to this extension of the secretary's regulations.8 The government plans to narrow the persons to whom it will give personal
notice in contest proceedings to those who are in the BLM records
themselves. "With this regulation, the BLM has undertaken to replace
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 9.
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id. at 16.
Id.
See 43 C.F.R. § 3833.5(d) (1979).
See Topaz Brief, supra note 72, at 16; Brief of Appellants, supra note 60, at 43.
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the county recorder's office as the acknowledged location of documents establishing ownership-title to unpatented mining claims."'I
The plaintiff-appellants point out that, in effect, the regulations
for section 314 ignore the Senate's warning that section 314 was not
intended to supercede or displace the existing recording requirements
under state law. 8 2 This would mean that the county records were intended by the Congress to continue to remain the official records for
determining ownership of unpatented mining claims. Therefore, the
American Mining Congress and the Colorado Mining Association contend that BLM is "precluded by due process of law from relying
solely on the BLM records to give notice to those persons whose
property rights, in unpatented mining claims, mill sites or tunnel sites
will be affected by any contest proceeding." 8
The district court, however, examined the quality of personal
notice intended by the federal government for contest proceedings
and determined that the regulation allowing the United States to rely
specifically on its own records (those of the BLM) and not on those
of the individual state courthouses did not violate due process.8
This interpretation of the personal notice requirements for the regulations under the FLPMA abandonment provisions is directly contradictory of the decisions cited earlier in Mullane, Schroeder and
Walker. 8 I Because the BLM record accumulation is solely dependent
upon mining claimants registering with the BLM and having notice of
the new FLPMA provisions to do so, the mine claimants who continue to follow the 1872 act and the state laws will never be included
in the BLM records. Their claims would be contested and no personal
notice would be given to them, even though the BLM could ascertain
their names and addresses from the state courthouse records.
3. The Government's Defenses
In defense of the FLPMA regulations, the United States, as the defendant-appellee, stresses the importance of the federal government's
lack of knowledge of the existence of unpatented mining claims
under the 1872 Mining Act and the necessity to have this information.8 6 The brief also discusses the merits of FLPMA, as viewed by
81. See Brief of Appellants, supra note 60, at 43.
82. Id. at 43-44.
83. Id. at 45.
84. See 479 F. Supp. 309 (D. Utah 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-2255 (10th Cir.
Dec. 3, 1979).
85. Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 200 (1962); Walker v. City of Hutchinson,
352 U.S. 112 (1956); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
86. Brief of Appellees the United States at 4, Topaz Beryllium Co. v. United States, No.
79-2255 (10th Cir.,
filed Nov. 21, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Brief of Appellees].
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the government: "The Act [FLPMA] repealed several outdated statutes; provided the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) with land-use
planning authority; revised the laws governing sales, exchanges, and
rights-of-way; and established improved range management procedures." 8 7
Sections 101 and 310 of FLPMA are relied upon for support for
the secretary's rulemaking authority. These are the sections which
the plaintiff-appellants attack as not giving the secretary broad inherent rulemaking powers. Section 101 empowers the secretary "to establish comprehensive rules and regulations" 8 8 and section 310 grants
authority to "promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the purposes of this Act." 8 9 Therefore, the government concludes that the
secretary is authorized to promulgate regulations requiring mine
claimants to submit information not expressly set forth in section 314
under the general rulemaking power granted under section 310.9
Section 314 as the filing and abandonment provision statute, must
have some basis for its regulatory provisions and this comes from sections 101 and 310.
The government ties the secretary's role as the manager of the
public lands to his general rulemaking powers. He possesses "broad,
inherent powers to prescribe necessary regulations for the administration of the public lands."'" Therefore, the secretary can "fill-in"
any gaps in the FLPMA procedures in order to make the procedures
effective as long as the regulations are reasonably related to statutory
goals and consistent with statutory directives.9 I
The reasonable relation between the regulations and the statute itself is also central to the government's argument. Its position is that
the secretary's regulations for section 314, as a supplement to the
notices or certificates of location and the documents filed annually
as required by section 314, are reasonable and consistent with congressional intent. 9 3 The government uses the same argument that its
regulations are reasonable and consistent with congressional intent to
defend the contest-proceeding notice requirement. 9 ' In a contest
proceeding, the government will notify personally only those persons
who have initially recorded their claims with the BLM or have filed
87. Id. at 5.
88.
89.
90.
91.

43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(5) (1976).
Id. § 1740.
Brief of Appellees, supra note 86, at 12-19.
Id. at 12.

92- Id.
93. Id. at 19-30.
94. Id. at 30-37.
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notices of transfer. 9" The Congress, according to the government's
brief, intended to remedy the necessity of the BLM conducting timeconsuming searches of county records to discover basic information
concerning a mining claim. 9 6 Again, the government is going to rely
upon its own records (the BLM's) which are developed from the
filings by mine claimants who have notice of FLPMA.
The BLM may have inaccurate and unreliable records showing who
occupies the public domain because some mine claimants still continue to file with the county recorders' offices, unaware that their
claims will be determined conclusively abandoned by the BLM and
that no notice of government contests will be given to them because
they had no knowledge of the initial registration requirement under
FLPMA. The government's purpose for developing the BLM mining
title records for better management of the public domain and for
clearing the public lands of stale and abandoned claims has merit.
Nevertheless, it does not override the importance of adhering to the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, which under Mullane
distinctly requires notice that is reasonably calculated to apprise the
parties before their property rights are extinguished. 9 ' Until Topaz
Beryllium is finally decided the issue remains: whether the mine
claimant, who is aware of the FLPMA requirements, can be required
by regulations to provide more information and to be subject to
harsh penalties for noncompliance with the regulations when the act
itself doesn't require this.
Coinciding with the issue of the secretary's authority to expand
the scope of FLPMA in the regulations is the question whether
FLPMA gave mine claimants adequate notice of the BLM filing requirements. An attempt to litigate this question was made in the federal district court for Nevada. Before the merits could be reached,
the case, Lewis v. United States, was dismissed for lack of a case or
controversy. 98
B. Lewis v. United States
In Lewis, 100 Nevada miners challenged FLPMA section 314 as
being unconstitutional and unenforceable on the grounds that it deprived them of their property without due process of law and that,
if enforced, it would result in a taking of their property without just
compensation. 9 The district judge ruled on the opposing parties'
95. 43 C.F.R. § 3833.5(d) (1979).
96. Brief of Appellees, supra note 86, at 31-32
97. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
98. See Lewis v. United States, No. R-78-0219 BRT (D. Nev. Aug. 29, 1980).
99. Plaintiffs' Complaint at 2, Lewis v. United States, No. R-78-0219 BRT (D. Nev.
Aug. 29, 1980).
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cross-motions for summary judgment, holding that the plaintiffs'
complaint failed to show the existence of a case or controversy
within the contemplation of Article III of the Constitution of the
United States.'I 0
The court's reason was that none of the plaintiffs had actually lost
their claims for failure to file with the BLM as required by FLPMA.
These miners were aware of the changed requirements for holding
mining claims and they chose to file with the BLM for fear of losing
their claims unless FLPMA were found to be unconstitutional.
Consequently, the type of successful plaintiff needed for challenging FLPMA's constitutionality, as regards the abandonment provisions, is someone who has continued to conform to the state law but
who has failed to file with the BLM as prescribed by FLPMA because
of lack of notice of the act.' 0I A wide variety of situations can be
imagined in which the mine claimant has no knowledge of FLPMA
and fails to file with the BLM. For example, notice by publication
would not be effective to protect claims of persons such as: a deceased mine claimant whose estate is unaware of the filing requirements of FLPMA; a mine claimant who sends someone else to the
county courthouse to file his annual assessment papers; or the mine

claimant who files his annual assessment papers at the county courthouse and never pays any attention to signs or other information
alerting miners to the new FLPMA requirements. The author has seen
signs posted by the states on bulletin boards or fliers placed on the
county recorder's reception desk in southern Colorado and New
Mexico, but these do not constitute notice under the Mullane standard when the federal government itself relies solely on notice given
100. Lewis v. United States, No. R-78-0219 BRT (D. Nev. Aug. 29, 1980).
101. Rogers v. United States, No. CV 80-114-H (D. Mont., filed July 3, 1980) is an
apparent case in which the mine claimant lost his claims for failure to file with FLPMA.
On April 23, 1981, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint with prejudice in Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618
(1981). The plaintiffs in this case sought a declaration that FLPMA was unconstitutional.
Among their claims was an allegation that the filing requirements of § 1744 are unreasonable and arbitrary and "that the § 1744(c) conclusive presumption of abandonment is a
'forfeiture statute with Due Process,' which is unreasonably harsh." Id. at 628. It is unclear
what a forfeiture statute with due process means. The court recognized that the injury to
the individual plaintiffs was a sufficiently immediate threat to give them standing. However,
the court rejected the plaintiffs' allegations that the filing requirements of § 1744 are unreasonable and arbitrary as being insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. Id. The court referred to the Topaz Beryllium district court opinion at 479 F.
Supp. 309 (D. Utah 1979). It further rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the § 1744(c)
provisions are unreasonably harsh in requiring the conclusive determination of abandonment
upon failure to file. Id. at 629-30. The court did not reach the merits of the claim that the
lack of personal notice to mine claimants is a denial of procedural due process because they
lacked standing to raise this claim. The plaintiffs did not allege that they have unpatented
mining claims located after October 21, 1976 or that they have filed or recorded any of
their claims located on or before October 21, 1976. Id. at 630.
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through publication of the law and of the regulations in the Federal
Register. Even if the individual states provide some additional notice
to that of legal reports or that of the Federal Register, there is still
no attempt to ascertain the names and addresses of those mine claimants who are complying with both the Mining Act of 1872 and the
state laws.
The Lewis plaintiffs argued that their mining claims were located
pursuant to the Mining Law of 1872.1 02 They and their predecessors
had also "located, developed, managed, leased, bought and sold unpatented mining claims for over a hundred years prior to the enactment of § 314 [ofI FLPMA at issue herein."' 0 3 Therefore, they asserted that they had valuable property rights recognized by the
United States government and entitled to protection under the Constitution of the United States.' 0 4
The plaintiffs extended the constitutional protections of their
claims, with their valuable property rights, to include compensation
for the taking of such property. They argued that the United States
does not have power to exercise absolute dominion and control over
unpatented mining claims so as to extinguish the plaintiffs' property
rights.' 0o

The Lewis mine claimants did not deny that the defendants have a
right to pass reasonable regulations regarding mining claims on the

public domain, nor did they question the defendants' desire to clear
stale claims from the public domain. Their contest concerned the
legality of the defendants' taking of active mining claims without
notice or compensation.'0 6
The government in its defense relied upon case law which allows a

congressionally created irrebuttable presumption to exist.' 07 The
irrebuttable presumption, in this case, is the FLPMA determination

that a mining claim is conclusively determined abandoned. Consequently, the defendants depended heavily on the legislative judgment
of the Congress in drafting the FLPMA abandonment provisions.
They contended that the FLPMA abandonment provisions in ques-

tion do not violate the claimants' constitutional rights and, therefore,
Congress has the discretion to impose such filing requirements as are
contained in FLPMA section 314.'

0

102. Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 3, Lewis v. United States, No.
R-78-0219 BRT (D. Nev. Aug 29, 1980).

103. Id.
104. Id. at 3-4.

105. Id. at 6.
106. Plaintiffs' Reply filed August 5, 1980 at 2, Lewis v. United States, No. R-78-0219
BRT (D. Nev. Aug. 29, 1980).
107. Defendants' Reply Memorandum, supra note 38, at 6-7.

108. Id. at 6-8.
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The government's arguments for FLPMA's constitutionality are
based upon the contention that the elements of "a taking of property
rights" do not exist. According to the defendants, FLPMA
does not purport to extinguish any claims, valid or invalid. It does
not authorize any acts to be performed by government officials in
derogation of the rights enjoyed by mining claimants. It does not
impose any restrictions upon a mining claimant's use of property
embraced in a mining claim. It does not impose any limitation upon
the long-recognized right of a mining claimant to hold and develop
a claim without obtaining a patent to the claimed land. 10 9
The reason for the government's assertions is that the statute
(FLPMA) merely requires the mine claimant to assert his or her claim
without assuming any burden for demonstrating the validity of such
claim (proof of discovery) and that the claimant can prevent the operation of the statute by applying for a patent.' 1 0 As explained
earlier, taking a mining claim to patent is extremely expensive and it
takes years to accomplish."' For purposes of mineral exploration
and exploitation, the patent rights to a fee simple absolute are not
necessary or even warranted. Therefore, the government's suggestion
that the aggrieved mine claimants, who do not wish to come under
the FLPMA filing requirements, can seek to patent their claims as a
means to avoid the FLPMA provisions is unrealistic. To avoid an injustice which arises from the government's failure to provide adequate personal notice to the mine claimant, the mine claimant should
not be forced to take all claims to patent.
Finally, the government bases its arguments for lack of personal
notice or a hearing for mine claimants upon the suppositions that the
mine claimants are presumed to know the law and that there is no
basis "for finding that it is beyond the authority of Congress to require
notice to the government as a condition to the continued maintenance
of an inchoate claim to property the legal title to which is in the United
States.""' 2 It was further maintained by the government that the
plaintiffs failed to show that the statute in question (FLPMA aban1
donment provisions) is "unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious."' 3
CONCLUSION
The conclusive determination of abandonment permitted by the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 is a major concept
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Summary Judgment Memorandum, supra note 39, at 17.
Id. at 17-17A, 17A n.10.
See note 24 and accompanying text, supra.
Summary Judgment Memorandum, supra note 39, at 20.
Id.
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in United States land law. Extinguishment of valuable property rights
occurs without a hearing, personal notice or other similar contact
with the property owner. The government relies upon publication of
the law and/or publication of the regulations in the Federal Register
to publish the new land law requirements.
The property rights in question are too valuable and too important
to leave to such uncertain notice as publication in the Federal Register or legal reporters. The Mullane standard for notice reasonably calculated under all the circumstances to apprise interested parties and
to afford them an opportunity to present their objections should be
the rule. The underlying premise of the Constitution of the United
States found in the Fifth Amendment due process clause is that each
person shall be given an opportunity to be heard before his property
rights are extinguished.
Not only do the requirements of FLPMA itself provide inadequate
notice, but so do the Secretary of the Interior's regulations promulgated under the abandonment and filing provisions of section 314.
If the mine claimant fails to know about FLPMA and doesn't file
with the BLM, the government is satisfied that in any ensuing government initiated contest the only source of personal notice will be
those same BLM records which obviously don't include the mine
claimant who had inadequate notice for the first filing.
There can be hundreds of mine claimants on the public domain
who still are unaware that FLPMA has extinguished their mining
claims. These are persons who haven't abandoned their claims and
who have complied and continue to comply in good faith with the
prior mining law.
In order to rectify the injustice to these good faith mine claimants,
the inadequacies of the notice provisions in FLPMA must be recognized. If the act is not required to be redrafted and reenacted or the
regulations amended, then why not grant pedis possessio to the mine
claimant while he/she restakes his/her claim and files with the BLM?
The most practical and fairest solution for the loss of a mining
claim because of lack of knowledge of FLPMA seems to be at a minimum, to take the mine claimant back to his/her status before discovery when he/she was merely in possession of the land. At this point,
while looking for valuable mineral or reestablishing the claim through
location, a miner can be given pedis possessio. Therefore, another
miner cannot overstake and take advantage of claimants' lack of
knowledge of FLPMA. They should rightfully have pedis possessio
because they have continued to work the land to substantiate the annual assessment affidavits, and they have shown good faith in complying with the state laws and the Mining Act of 1872. This remedy
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should not be available to those who have truly abandoned their claims
and now want to take advantage of an opportunity to claim that they,
too, had no notice of the new FLPMA filing requirements. The miner
must at least have been complying with the annual filing requirements established by the Mining Act of 1872 and filing in the county
courthouse under state law.
All segments of the mining industry are affected by the application
of FLPMA. If the BLM records are inaccurate, then all run the risk of
not getting adequate notice before extinguishment of their claims.
Likewise, if the FLPMA regulations are invalid, then the rights of the
persons filing with the BLM under FLMPA are also impaired.
TENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS DECISION:
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Topaz Beryllium after
this article was written and before it went to press. The opinion, issued on May 21, 198 1, upheld the Secretary of the Interior's authority to promulgate rules and regulations for FLPMA. The court clarified certain sections of the Secretary's regulations. As to the American
Mining Congress and the Colorado Mining Association argument that
the Secretary's regulations in 43 C.F.R. § 3833 requiring supplemental filings not required by FLPMA itself go beyond the scope of the
Secretary's authority, the court concluded that they do not.' 14 The
court found "that the Secretary has not ignored § 1744(c) [of
FLPMA] which assumes that even defective filings put the Secretary
on notice of a claim, and we hold that once on notice, the Secretary
cannot deem a claim abandoned merely because the supplemental
filings required only by § 3833-and not by the statute-are not
made.... Placed in their proper perspective, the challenged supplemental filings represent the Secretary's effort to 'fill in' the broad
outlines of FLPMA."'I'I The court went on to say that the "Supreme Court consistently held that similar grants of general rulemaking authority [such as that to the Secretary of the Interior] sustain the validity of detailed regulations which are designed to achieve
with reasonable effectiveness the purposes for which Congress has
acted. .
16
As to the challenge by all appellants to 43 C.F.R. §3833.5(d),
which requires that notice be personally given in government initiated
contests only to those persons who have filed with the BLM or have
114. Topaz Beryllium v. United States, No. 79-2255, slip op. at 6 (10th Cir. May 21,
1981).
115. Id. at 6-7.
116. Id. at 8.
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filed a notice of transfer of interest, the court clarified that the regulation only speaks to government initiated contests.' 1 7 In contests
initiated by third parties, however, the court concluded that the local
county courthouse records will remain the official repositories for
giving notice. Any broader reading of § 3833.5(d) will be appealable
in the tenth circuit and this interpretation will be the rule in the circuit. ' 18 The court, therefore, upheld the government's right to rely
upon its own records [at the BLM] in government initiated contests.
These records do not include the mine claimants who failed to file
with the BLM because of lack of notice of FLPMA and who are still
filing at local courthouses. In conjunction with its conclusion that
the government can rely upon its own records in government initiated
contests, the court stated that: ". . . FLPMA contains numerous provisions evidencing Congress' intent to grant the Secretary broad regulatory authority over public lands. Part of that authority is expressed
in the Secretary's ability to initiate a proceeding contesting or clarifying a party's interest in a paritcular parcel of public land." '1 '
The notice to the government of a transfer of title from one mine
claimant to another, as required by the Secretary's regulations, was
not discussed in this article. However, the court's opinion dealing
with this section of the regulations gives some insight into how the
tenth circuit will approach future questions of the notice requirements of due process. The court stated that "[tI he notice of transfer
provisions merely provide a procedure by which the Secretary can
more efficiently satisfy his due process obligation to give notice to
affected parties when he initiates a contest. It does not by itself work
a forfeiture.
. 2 0 The court gave its opinion that "this notice
procedure is reasonably related to the broad concerns for the management of public lands set forth in FLPMA, as well as the Secretary's unchallenged authority to initiate contests concerning public
lands and that the procedure wholly comports with due process of
law." ' 21
After the tenth circuit's decision in Topaz Beryllium, litigation of
the major due process question with which this comment deals, the
improper notice of the FLPMA abandonment provisions to mine
claimants who are still complying in good faith with the pre-FLPMA
mining law, seem to lie in the constitutional attacks upon FLPMA
itself.
MARIKAY LEE-MARTINEZ
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 9.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 9-10.
Id. at 10.

